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and Research in the Netherlands
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This study examines risk in higher education and research on the basis of a classification into
three domains. The practical utility of this division into three domains is that it makes it easier
to see what risks are unique to higher education (custodianship of knowledge), what risks are
dependent on developments in society (microcosm of society) and what risks faced by an
educational establishment are no different from those facing any other organization (education
as an organization). The results of a survey of the field (through questionnaires, meetings and
interviews) show that higher education institutions still do not routinely have an integrated
policy on safety, security and crisis management. Within individual institutions, there is little
communication between the three. Institutions, staff and students have limited awareness of the
range of risks to which they and their environment are exposed. At the same time, establish-
ments tend not to share their experiences in this field with others. Even within individual
institutions, there is often little involvement of staff and students in safety and security policy
and its implementation.
1. Introduction
Higher education and research is largely faced
with the same ‘new’ and the same ‘conventional’
safety and security risks as other sectors in
society. In other sectors, e.g. commerce and
industry, these risks may present a direct threat
to the quality and continuity of a company’s
operations. In the educational sector, they may
have a direct influence on the continuity of higher
education and research.
One example of the problem of security in
higher education is the vulnerability of informa-
tion systems in the virtual learning environment
(leading to problems of the authenticity, manip-
ulation and theft of information). Another is the
vulnerability of the expanding physical infrastruc-
ture of higher education (with problems of theft,
increasingly complex health and safety condi-
tions, fire). Possibly the most well known exam-
ple of recent times in the Netherlands was the fire
in the computing centre at Twente University of
Technology. This was a ‘conventional’ disaster
which, due to the location of the fire, was
immediately linked to the ‘new’ problem of safety
and security: protecting information, and tem-
porarily replacing and subsequently restarting an
ICT system that is essential to the university’s
research and teaching.
On 20 November 2002 a fire was deliberately
started in the university complex. It devastated
the university’s computing centre and reduced
to ashes the rooms of dozens of members of
staff belonging to three faculties. The damage
was put at forty to fifty million euros. This is
apart from the loss of data collected in years of
experiments which were stored by individual
members of staff in their rooms. For the coun-
try’s insurers, the fire was the signal to review
policies throughout the Netherlands and scru-
tinize the risk assessments of universities, col-
leges and research establishments.
This example illustrates the need for both risk
management and crisis management.1 Educa-
tional and research institutions simply cannot
abdicate from involvement in developments in
and around themselves, the concomitant safety
and security issues, and the logical consequence
which is the wish for policy and accountability.
Responsibility for all this lies in the Netherlands
with the institutions themselves.
The purpose of the present study is to con-
tribute to the development of insights and tools
for the benefit of safety, security and crisis man-
agement in higher education and science. Key
concepts in the study are anticipating risks, being
realistic in preparing for them, and understand-
ing the context of higher education and research
institutions. The research for it was based on an
integrated approach which ties in with existing
structures and starting-points for policy such as
the autonomy of educational and research estab-
lishments.
The research was carried out in four phases.
Phase 1. Getting started
Phase 1 of the research consisted of designing a
project plan in which the design and substance of
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the research were further elaborated on the
basis of a preliminary survey. In particular,
the preliminary survey gave us a framework for
the performance of the risk survey in the next
phase.
The preliminary survey covered the whole of
higher education and research. In it, we used:
– Extensive desk research: international acade-
mic literature, research reports, policy papers,
legislation and regulation, and the Internet.
– Face-to-face interviews with key informants
from the Ministry of Education, Culture &
Science and other ministries, educational in-
stitutions, research establishments, ancillary
services and external experts.
– A telephone survey of selected institutions in
order to gather practical information about the
current state of affairs in safety and security
management in the widest sense.
Phase 2. Nationwide survey
Phase 2 consisted of conducting a nationwide
survey to reveal what risks are already being
recognised in higher education, in addition to
showing what structures and methods (e.g. best
practice) are already in place for their manage-
ment. When compared with the results of the
initial survey the risk survey revealed the gaps in
current safety and security management in the
Netherlands, but at the same time it produced
some best practices which are worth sharing.
The risk survey used a structured question-
naire. This was differentiated according to insti-
tution, risk type and responsibilities within
individual institutions. Following testing in a
number of trial interviews the questionnaire
was sent to all higher education institutions in
the Netherlands. The complete results of the
questionnaire are available as Appendix 1 of the
online article (please see link on page 159).
Phase 3. Qualitatively validating and interpreting
the results
On the basis of the results from phases 1 and 2 a
draft report was written which then served as
input for two working conferences on safety,
security and crisis management in higher edu-
cation and research. The first of these conferen-
ces concentrated on operational responsibilities
within individual institutions. The draft report
was discussed, as were the general areas in which
solutions might be sought for the risks identified
by the COT. The second conference focused on
administrative responsibilities.
During the working conferences the draft re-
port was taken as the basis for identifying and
further discussing the ‘blank spots’ in current
safety, security and crisis management policy.
The report of the administrative working confer-
ence is available as Appendix 2 of the online
article (please see link on page 159). Comments
arising have been incorporated into this report as
and where appropriate.
This article presents the result of the first three
phases of the research.
Phase 4. Developing a Higher Education Safety and
Security Audit
The research framework for the risk survey was
further refined to create an audit or self-audit
framework for periodically determining the state
of affairs in respect of safety and security man-
agement; this in turn led to the Higher Education
Safety and Security Audit, which is available as
Appendix 3 of the online article (please see link
on page 159).
2. Risks
Starting from the natural understanding of the
term ‘risk’, the well known fact that there is no
single, unambiguous definition of the term ‘risk’
that has the unalloyed support of all experts in
the field of ‘safety and security’ still is surprising.
In the literature we find all sorts of definitions of
the term. Gratt (1993), for example, presented 14
different definitions of risk, while Vlek (1990) had
earlier done comparable work in which he dis-
tilled 20 definitions from the literature.
Risk implies both insecurity or uncertainty and
undesirability. In the words of a Dutch govern-
mental advising body: risk is the possibility, with
a certain degree of probability, of damage to
human health, to the environment and to prop-
erty, combined with the nature and extent of that
damage (Gezondheidsraad, 1995).
If we wish to compare risks objectively, how-
ever, in order perhaps to arrive at a priority
ranking of safety and security measures, we
would naturally prefer to have a solid measure
with which we can determine the nature and
magnitude of a risk. The insurance world has
long had just such a measure: the simple formula
‘risk equals probability times damage’, the result
being expressed (in the Netherlands at least) in
euros. For its target group, this is an eminently
convenient formula. The abstracted version of
this formula is widely accepted among safety
and security experts: risk is probability times
effect. The impossibility of comparing ‘apples
and pears’ means that in the actuality of admin-
istration this formula is of little practical value. Of
course, even for insurers there is still the problem
of finding significant data on the basis of which it
will be possible to calculate the probability of a
particular type of accident occurring and causing
a given financial loss.
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As soon as we try to apply this formula more
widely than insurance policy holders and the
financial loss arising out of accidents caused by
or befalling them, we are immediately faced with
the problem of how to quantify probability and
effect. Disagreements on the subject of risk man-
agement can often be traced back to choices
made regarding the definition of the limits of
the system to be examined. (RIVM, 2003: 19) The
discussion is then often about what constitutes a
risk-bearing activity, what constitutes damage or
loss, how to define the causal link that has to be
proved, and within what period the effects have
to become apparent.
One of the problems in the case of higher
education and research is that it is difficult to
calculate the probability of laboratory accidents or
to quantify the effect of, say, damage to public
image or reputation. It is therefore predictably
impossible to arrive at a uniform hard and fast
yardstick against which risks in higher education
and research can be measured.
Some researchers take the stand that ‘all risk is
perception’, i.e. that there is no usable distinction
between an objectified risk and a perception of a
risk. ‘A risk is a social construct: it is constructed
by actors. Objective data may play a part, but this
need not be the case. Often there are no reliable
data, assumptions on which the calculations are
based are often debatable, and in any case a risk,
by definition, contains an element of unpredict-
ability’ (De Bruin, 1999: 125).
If all risk is a matter of perception, then the
question for those who have to assess risks is
what aspects of a given risk play an important
part in that perception. One of the first systematic
attempts to investigate when, in the public per-
ception, the advantages of an activity or technol-
ogy outweigh the safety risks associated with it
was carried out by Starr (1969: 1232–1238). In
1969 he concluded that the acceptance of risks
taken freely (such as driving a car or smoking) is
roughly a thousand times that of imposed risks.
Later research, principally by Slovic and Fischoff
in the United States (for an overview: Slovic,
2000) and Vlek and Stallen in the Netherlands
(Vlek & Stallen, 1996: 9–31), points to the
perception of a risk being determined by a
number of important and sometimes intercon-
nected aspects. However, we have not yet
reached the stage of being able to produce con-
sistent modelling of the above factors in a way
that has any practical predictive value (Sjo¨berg,
2002: 665–669).
A classification of risks in higher education and
research
In the present study the risks that occur or have
the potential of occurring in higher education are
described on the basis of a classification into
three domains. This classification is designed to
reflect the diversity of elements that play a part in
safety and security in higher education.
Risks are assigned to the following three
domains:
a. Higher education as a microcosm of society
(social safety and security)
b. Higher education and research as an organi-
sation (organisational safety and security)
c. Higher education and research as a custodian
of knowledge (security of knowledge)
Naturally it will always be important to take
account of the fact that risks do not really lend
themselves to classification into strictly bounded
categories: the risks of fire is regarded as a
primary risk to physical safety, but there can be
no denying that it has points of contact with
social safety and security. For example, neglect
increases the risk of fire and arson. The vulner-
ability of ICT is a risk faced by all organisations,
but in higher education and research it is an
essential risk to the security of knowledge.
The risks falling under the domain of higher
education as a microcosm of society are the risks
that face society at large and are therefore auto-
matically reflected in higher education with its
public function. This means that the risks in-
volved are mainly threats to the safety and
security of society.
The risks falling under the domain of higher
education as an organisation are the same risks
that face every organisation and hence also face
the education sector. This is a diverse group of
risks which includes fraud, theft and fire. How-
ever, because it is very much more than a matter
of mere physical safety, we have elected here to
use the term ‘organisational safety and security’.
The risks that fall under the domain of higher
education as a custodian of knowledge are risks
connected with the vulnerability of the primary
process of education: acquiring, managing and
disseminating knowledge. There are several ways
in which knowledge can be lost or accidentally
disseminated. One important risk in this domain
is associated with the vulnerability of the ICT
structure within educational and research estab-
lishments. The loss of information can pose a
threat to academic, scientific, commercial and
social interests.
The practical utility of this division into three
domains is that it makes it easier to see what risks
are unique to higher education (custodianship of
knowledge), what risks are dependent on devel-
opments in society (microcosm of society) and
what risks faced by an educational establishment
are no different from those facing any other
organisation (education as an organisation).
In order to further subdivide the domains of
social safety and security, physical safety and
security and the security of knowledge, we use
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two dimensions: a) the reasons for a risk, and b)
the consequences that arise if the risk materializes.
Risks may be the result of two sources: an
internal cause (within the institution or an ex-
ternal cause (outside the institution).
This division into two domains gives the in-
stitution a handle on safety, security and crisis
management, because it makes it possible to see
to what extent the institution itself can affect the
occurrence of the risk. A risk that is the result of
external causes is less amenable to control than a
risk that arises outside the walls of the institution
concerned.
As a second distinction, risks can be divided
according to the impact they have, which may be
an internal impact or an external impact.
In the case of an internal impact the institution
is the primary owner of the problem and thus has
primary responsibility for tackling the situation.
In the case of an external impact the institution is
probably not the primary owner of the problem.
Tackling the problem will in any event entail
consultation with external partners such as the
local authority, police and psychosocial services.
E.g. social safety 
and security within 
institution
E.g. information 
leaking abroad
E.g. incidents 
caused by 
placement 
students on 
institution’s own 
course
E.g. internal 
fraudPrimarily 
internal
cause
effectPrimarily 
internal 
Primarily 
external
Primarily 
external
Using this distinction it is also possible to take
a conscious look at the effect of macro and micro
trends:
– Macro trends are developments in society that
affect the nature and magnitude of both new
and existing risks. Macro trends are thus of
particularly direct relevance to risks in higher
education with a primarily external cause.
(Rosenthal, 2001)
– Micro trends are developments within the
institution that affect the nature and magni-
tude of risks. Micro trends thus have a direct
effect principally on risks in higher education
that have a primarily internal cause.
Trends in the development of risk
To gain sufficient insight into the development of
risks within higher education and research in-
stitutions it is necessary to have careful monitor-
ing of both macro and micro trends.
The macro trends that are relevant to the
present study are:
 Rising levels of aggression and violence, often
involving firearms, both in society in general
and in schools, are necessitating careful con-
sideration of the likelihood that this trend will
also manifest itself in higher education.
 Cutbacks and efficiency operations (whether
or not as part of privatization and encoura-
ging competition) are tending to cream off the
redundancy of staff and resources which
helps prevent risks. This trend is also appar-
ent in the institutions of higher education and
research.
 The ongoing development and increasing use
of ICT at the same time have the effect of
increasing our dependency on it. Institutions
are increasingly vulnerable to viruses, hack-
ers, power outages and other electronic in-
conveniences.
 ‘Tolerance is out’: the trend is towards zero
tolerance. This means that methods of enfor-
cing rules and regulations are under constant
development at both local and national level.
This trend will clearly have the primary effect
of reducing all sorts of risks, but it is also
having a secondary effect in that it magnifies
the impact of each incident, as it suggests that
in the past there has been insufficient over-
sight and/or enforcement. Higher education
establishments have to deal with this as
applicants for licences etc., but at the same
time they are expected to have their own
vision of enforcement within their own in-
stitution.
 The multiculturalisation of society is increas-
ing in the Netherlands. However, while it is
widely seen as cultural enrichment, multi-
culturalisation must also be considered a
potential source of tension. For example, the
tensions between population groups of differ-
ing cultural backgrounds may be exacerbated
by events elsewhere in the world.
By taking account of these macro trends, an
institution can try to limit current risks through
proactive action. In this way the University of
Amsterdam, having identified the macro trend of
multiculturalisation, responded proactively to the
threat of war in Iraq in 2003 with a preventively
scaled-up Crisis Management Team which as-
sessed the social safety and security risks arising
out of the tense situation.
A micro trend affects the probability of a risk
materializing within the walls of a given institu-
tion. Identifying micro trends calls for the careful
use of risk awareness, reporting procedures and
incident analysis.
One important type of micro trend is some-
times known as structural incidentalism: the fre-
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quent occurrence of minor incidents of a parti-
cular type often presages a major incident of the
same type. One example is the risk of fire. If
several waste-paper baskets are set on fire in a
school within a short space of time, it is impor-
tant to recognize that this is a coherent pattern:
growing numbers of minor incidents of arson are
a sign of a growing risk of a future possibly more
serious fire.
Other examples of micro trends in higher
education and research are graffiti, which indicate
low social safety and security at the site, while
racist slogans appearing at various sites in an
establishment may be a sign of rising tension
within it.
3. Crises
Risks materialize as incidents. Many incidents
within the domain of higher education and
research are dealt with, to varying degrees of
success, at a decentralized level within the in-
stitution concerned, but some incidents develop
to become a crisis requiring every possible effort
if a resolution is to be achieved.
A crisis is defined here as a threat to the basic
structures of higher education and research, such
that critical decisions are needed which have to
be taken quickly and with inadequate informa-
tion (Rosenthal et al., 1989: 10).
On the theoretical and practical aspects of
crisis management many articles have appeared
in this journal. It is a matter of conjunction and
study to see in what way exactly these are
applicable in higher education and research.
This article will focus on the risks which can be
found in higher education and research.
To be able to manage incidents and crises it is
necessary to have an insight into the general
crisis trends identified in the literature. This will
help not only in effectively managing a crisis but
also in deciding in advance which risks need to be
given more attention.
As was the case with risks, also for crisis trends
can be distinguished (see for example: Rosenthal
et al., 2001):
 Politicisation. In today’s world a crisis is soon
about more than the crisis per se. The func-
tioning of the system concerned and indeed
that of the individuals involved is almost
immediately in the spotlight, and the demand
for public accountability cannot be resisted.
Independent investigation is often almost a
primary requirement.
 Mediatisation. There has been a sharp rise in
the attention the media pay to crises, to the
extent that it now plays a major part in
the politicisation of crises. The battle for the
hearts and minds of the general public has
thus become an important task, particularly
for the administrators involved. However, it is
important to be aware that the concept of
media management is an illusion: the media
cannot be managed. It is a matter of earning,
rather than managing, public confidence.
 Mobilization. The modern citizen is a great
deal more vocal than were citizens in the past.
He mobilizes fellow victims, the media and
the legal system in his efforts to gain ‘justice’.
There is no crisis without an interest group or
lobby. In higher education, of course, the self-
mobilizing student has been a familiar given
since the nineteen-sixties.
 Juridification. Mobilization is closely related to
the growing juridification of crises. In the first
place it is possible to see rising activism in the
criminal law, which is held by those involved
to have considerable capacity for furnishing
truth and retribution. More than in the past,
then, there is a preliminary criminal investi-
gation followed by criminal prosecution. The
‘Americanisation of society’ is another ex-
pression in the Netherlands that covers a
great deal of ground. In practice, it often
means mainly the growing litigiousness of
our society, and the way those who are
involved in crises are increasingly inclined to
take those seen as their instigators to court.
 Complexification. Experience shows that each
new crisis tends to involve more and more
actors, each having or claiming their own role,
responsibility or authority. To these actors, the
trends outlined above mean that they cannot
simply allow a crisis to run its course. This
means that crisis management is increasingly
a matter of involving the right players in the
complex network of those involved. In pre-
paring for a crisis, therefore, it is important to
have knowledge of this network and the
competence to operate within it.
 Internationalization. One aspect of complex-
ification is the internationalization of crises,
and as elsewhere the international compo-
nent is becoming stronger in higher educa-
tion and research. Students come from all
over the world to every university, and re-
search projects are increasingly a matter of
international cooperation and collaboration.
An inevitable consequence of this is increased
vulnerability of institutions’ public image both
at home and internationally.
4. Higher education as a microcosm of
society
This section looks at the risks enumerated in
section 2 under the heading of higher education
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as a microcosm of society. In this section they are
broken down into primarily internal and primar-
ily external impacts.
To begin with, here are some general conclu-
sions from the survey and interviews.
The present state of affairs
The degree to which social safety and security is
seen as a live issue varies widely from institution
to institution. Most institutions say that they are
paying more attention to the subject than in the
past, yet half of them see no risks in the social
sphere that necessitate taking new initiatives in
this area. By contrast, the other half say that social
safety and security has high, if not the highest,
priority within their institutions. The majority of
this group are universities situated in large towns
and cities. They are taking the initiatives neces-
sary to reduce risks in the area of social safety and
security.
Risk perception, developments
The response to the questionnaire shows that
institutions are wholly or almost wholly failing to
identify many risks in the area of social safety and
security. Only familiar risks such as theft, sexual
harassment and violence are perceived as risks,
and only a very few institutions see more diffuse
threats such as extremism or terrorism as a risk
against which some degree of countermeasures
need be taken.
Institutions were asked about perceived devel-
opments in the field of social safety and security.
Many referred to the more intensive collabora-
tion between universities and colleges aimed at
an integrated approach to safety and security
issues. In general it is recognized that develop-
ments in society mean that the importance of
effective safety and security policy is increasing.
Reference was made to a sea change in thinking
about safety and security: from loss control to
providing a safe and secure environment. Part of
this sea change is stressing the right norms and
values that determine the parameters of social
intercourse within the organisation. This is ne-
cessary precisely because scaling up and effi-
ciency operations tend to lead to a decline in
social control.
Reporting and recording incidents
Almost every institution reports incidents to its
board of governors, a complaints committee or a
security officer. Most institutions have reporting
procedures which work with complaints forms
and the like. Reporting frequency varies from
institution to institution from daily to annually.
At some institutions only very serious incidents
are reported to the police.
Risk survey
In half of all cases, social safety and security is
part of the institution’s risk survey. Roughly a
quarter of respondents say they do nothing in
this area. The vast majority of institutions say
they have no concrete plans to improve social
safety and security.
Involving internal and external players
More than half the institutions say they encou-
rage staff to make comments and suggestions in
the area of social safety and security. In many of
these institutions, staff are in one way or another
kept informed of safety and security policy and
any changes to it. This is achieved through
personal contact, staff circulars, the website,
items in house journals, and emails. Some in-
stitutions train their staff in how to get on with
‘difficult’ individuals, or give assertiveness
courses.
Few social safety and security initiatives are
developed to involve students. However, inci-
dents when they occur are often the trigger for
launching public education campaigns aimed at
an institution’s students. A limited number of
institutions issue leaflets drawing students’ atten-
tion to the complaints procedure and the pre-
sence of confidential consellors. Only a few
institutions actively involve the student body in
the design of safety and security policy.
There is still little consultation with relevant
external players such as the police. Indeed, formal
obstacles have led to some institutions being
disenchanted with their experience of collaborat-
ing with the police. A few others, by contrast,
have made considerable progress in social safety
and security precisely through intensive colla-
boration with the police.
Social risks with a primarily internal
impact
In this section we examine social risks with a
primarily internal impact as they emerged during
the study.
Theft
It is clear from the questionnaires returned that
theft is one of the most frequently occurring types
of incident.
Many institutions say they have trouble with
persons unconnected with the institution com-
mitting theft or burglary. The institutions ac-
knowledge that in general they are highly
accessible, which makes them an attractive target
for criminals. By and large the institutions have
no clear picture of what percentage of thefts are
carried out by their own staff or students, though
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the security manager at one university estimates
that 75% of thefts are committed by students or
employees on an opportunistic basis.
Two unknown men walked into a university
and said they were employed by a local firm. At
their request, two staff members helped them
load two television sets into a van. It later
emerged that the men were thieves.
Employees are seldom vetted, even if in the
course of their duties they are likely to have
access to virtually all the facilities of the institu-
tion. Even elementary checks such as asking for a
good conduct certificate (a document obtainable
from a person’s local authority or police as
evidence that they do not have a criminal record)
or inquiries of former employers are not routine
practice. Security staff expressed the opinion that
if it were known that checks of this kind would be
carried out, it would have a filtering effect: a
person bent on criminal activity is less likely to
apply for a job for which a good conduct certifi-
cate is required.
Where a person is found to have committed
theft, the policy in many cases is to involve the
police. In serious cases the institution’s governing
board will also be informed. However, in a
substantial percentage of cases of theft the of-
fence will not be reported to the police. Instead,
equipment is recorded as having broken down.
Part of the explanation for this behaviour is said
to be shame on the part of staff who realize that
by their naivety or lack of insight they have more
or less made the theft possible.
Intimidation, sexual harassment and violence
A survey by the Open Universiteit shows that
intimidation and sexual harassment are not con-
fined to primary and secondary schools. Surveys
of two universities of professional education
revealed that, in their own perception, 16% of
students had at some time or another been
bullied, subjected to sexual harassment, ‘shut
out’ or discriminated against (HBO Journaal,
2001). In the course of the present study it
became apparent that little information is avail-
able on this subject, partly because it is still
largely a taboo area. (This contrasts with the
vocational and adult education sector, where
intimidation is a current issue. See e.g: Van
Zundert, 2002). Reliable statistics on violence,
sexual harassment and comparable issues are
simply not available when it comes to higher
education. Following the Open Universiteit
study, questions were asked in parliament of
the then minister of Education, Culture &
Science. The minister observed that the study
was not a representative sample of higher educa-
tion in the Netherlands, but conceded that the
picture that had emerged from incidents at a
number of faculties was ‘worrying’: ‘Institutions
of education must guarantee pupils and students
a safe environment in which to learn. This is a
sine qua non for any form of education.’ (TK,
2001: 11510).
Staff at institutions of higher education are
experiencing growing levels of intimidation and
aggression from students. The explanation put
forward for this is the growing propensity for
students to make demands (a development that is
part of the broader evolution of society at large,
sometimes known as the development of the
demanding society). If, in his own perception, a
student’s needs are not being met fast enough,
every now and then this leads to threats and
verbal intimidation. Respondents to the present
study know of employees in service-providing
departments of their institution, e.g. audiovisual
services, who regularly feel that they are under
serious threat.
About a third of the institutions surveyed for
this study call intimidation and violence one of
the larger risks for educational establishments.
Like other forms of aggression, intimidation
and sexual harassment fall within the scope of
the Working Conditions Act of 1998. This means
that the employer has a duty to take preventive
steps to protect both employees and students. At
the same time an institution also has an obligation
to install measures that will limit the impact of an
incident, e.g. by appointing counsellors or psy-
chologists who can help the victims of an incident.
Here too it is up to the institutions themselves to
determine what form their policy on such matters
should take, though there is an obligation to carry
out a risk survey and evaluation.
Growing use of weapons
Along with intimidation, sexual harassment and
violence, the rising tendency for pupils at schools
to carry firearms is a potential danger. At the time
of writing we know of no cases of incidents at
higher education establishments involving fire-
arms in the possession of students. But when
there are signs of a growing weapons-carrying
culture at secondary schools, attention to the
potential for problems in higher education would
seem desirable.
No statistics are available for the carrying of
weapons in higher education institutions or in-
cidents involving weapons in higher education.
This applies not only to the Netherlands but
seemingly to other countries as well. The carrying
of weapons, then, is not seen by most institutions
as a major problem, and accordingly virtually no
steps are taken to detect weapons or to prevent
people entering buildings or institution premises
while carrying a weapon.
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Intolerance resulting in discrimination or violence
The multi-ethnicity of Dutch society is reflected,
albeit still largely to a lesser extent, within the
country’s higher education system. In the larger
towns and cities, particularly, there is a broad
palette of different cultures. One effect of this is
that events in other parts of the world can act to
help create tensions between people of different
cultural or religious backgrounds. As with the risk
of the growing culture of carrying weapons,
although higher education establishments in the
Netherlands have so far been spared any serious
problems in this area there is no guarantee that
the problems that are already occurring in
secondary schools will not also materialize in
higher education.
Quite a few institutions indicated that they
recognize this risk and are alert to it. Following
the war in Iraq the University of Amsterdam’s
crisis management team, for example, has met
several times in order to carry out a risk analysis
of the situation.
Social risks with a primarily external
impact
In this section we examine risks with a primarily
external impact as they emerged during the
study. The risks in question have no direct impact
on safety and security within institutions, but are
nevertheless closely linked to it.
Individual students’ problems leading to incidents
outside the institution
Numbers of students calling on the services of a
student psychologist have risen sharply in recent
years. There are various reasons for this, includ-
ing loneliness, depression, fear of failure, pro-
blems with personal relationships, and the
pressures of academic work (Smit 2001). The
result may be alcohol and/or drug abuse, declin-
ing academic performance and even suicide.
Following eleven suicides in the space of two
academic years the Catholic University of Leu-
ven (Belgium) initiated an investigation of the
causes. Of the eleven victims, nine were male.
Student suicide is a problem for which few
statistics are available, whether in Leuven or at
universities in the rest of Europe. More work
has been done on the subject in the US. The
three main immediate factors in student sui-
cides, the university found, were personal pro-
blems, study-related problems and financial
problems. (Vandendriessche & Raskin, 2000)
The majority of the institutions surveyed in the
Netherlands say that very serious incidents (e.g.
suicide) relating to individual students’ problems
are rare or non-existent. The institutions have a
system of study supervisors, counsellors and
psychologists to whom students with problems
can turn. In urgent cases the student will be
referred to one of the organisations providing
professional help. The risk itself is recognized: the
University of Twente, for example, has taken
steps to ensure that it is no longer possible to
jump off tall buildings.
Incidents caused by placement students and student
assistants at other institutions
It occasionally happens that a placement student
or student assistant comes off the rails and passes
on sensitive, confidential information or causes
damage. The placement student’s ‘home’ institu-
tion has a certain responsibility for the behaviour
of its students, but the extent to which that
responsibility entails liability depends partly on
the wording of the placement contract and the
preparation or supervision given to the student.
At one of the institutions surveyed for this study,
a number of serious incidents led to the complete
redesigning of its placement contracts so as to
limit the institution’s liability in the event of
damage.
Antisocial behaviour connected with student
societies
Over the years there have been a number of
incidents in student societies in the Netherlands
leading to injuries and even fatalities. Most of
these have occurred in the context of initiation
rites, and in many cases there had been excessive
consumption of alcohol.
In principle an institution has no direct re-
sponsibility for what goes on either inside or
outside student societies. Every institution does,
however, have a natural sense of having a duty of
care towards its students – in addition to which,
incidents can have a damaging effect on the
image of the institution. This is why more recent
incidents have elicited a more active response
from the governing boards of the institutions
concerned.
In 2001 sanctions were imposed on Veritas and
Unitas, two student societies in Utrecht, when it
emerged that incidents had occurred during
society initiation rites. Both the University of
Utrecht and Utrecht University of Professional
Education broke off relations with Veritas. A
senior student had extinguished a cigarette on
the arm of an aspiring member. Unitas was less
severely punished with a conditional suspen-
sion and withdrawal of subsidies. (NRC Han-
delsblad, 17 October 2000)
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Alcohol and drug use among students
In the Netherlands the Education Council (On-
derwijsraad) has established that, unlike smoking
and obesity, alcohol consumption is greater
among the well educated than among the less
well educated (Onderwijsraad, 2002: 44). At the
same time consumption of narcotics and stimu-
lants among students in higher education is
considerable. According to a survey of 750 stu-
dents at the University of Amsterdam conducted
by the university newspaper Folia, roughly a
third of all students occasionally smoke a joint
(Folia, 2002). One in ten students say they
sometimes use cocaine. The five most popular
drugs to emerge from the Folia survey are can-
nabis, ecstasy, cocaine, mushrooms and speed.
The respondents said that they tended to take
drugs mainly at the weekends and in the
evenings.
Most consumption of alcohol and drugs at
higher education establishments in the Nether-
lands takes place outside the walls of the institu-
tion. The institution has no primary responsibility
for it, but some nevertheless take the problem
seriously. In 1997 the rector of Delft University of
Technology said publicly that he wanted students
to change their drinking habits. This followed an
incident of excessive alcohol abuse at a student
society initiation in Groningen which resulted in
one death and a serious injury after the victims
each drank a litre of Dutch gin. The rector
announced that he wished to engage in a dialo-
gue with all the Delft student societies, not in
order to impose rules or prohibitions, but to bring
about a change in attitude. ‘This may not be our
direct responsibility’, he said, ‘but the University
still feels responsible’ (Delta, 1997).
Extremism in higher education
Students, as highly educated citizens, have al-
ways had a tradition of criticism. Interest groups
and single-issue parties often find fertile ground
for their ideas in the institutions of higher educa-
tion. Most of these groups express their criticism
in peaceful and often entertaining protest, but
there are also those who are prepared to use
violence to lend force to their arguments, and in
the area of antiglobalism, the environment and
animal rights there are groups and individuals in
the Netherlands who have shown themselves
willing to resort to violence and destruction of
property. Because of their very nature, then, the
institutions of higher education may find them-
selves the unintentional catalysts of social unrest.
Terrorism
The situation as regards terrorism may be seen as
broadly similar to the above. The nature of higher
education establishments makes them attractive
to terrorists, not so much as targets but as centres
of recruitment and places where they can go to
ground. In the higher education sector this pro-
blem and its associated risks are still receiving
very little attention (COT, 2003: 4).
One of the blackest scenarios is having a
terrorist cell inside the institution. Mohammed
Atta and other aircraft hijackers studied at the
university of technology in Hamburg, where they
held informal meetings (Flinn, 2002): actual re-
cruitment took place in the city’s mosques. Fun-
damentalist Muslim groups have also found
supporters in the Netherlands, and are recruiting
students for campaigns of violence. According to
the security services most of those involved are
members of the Moroccan community. ‘On the
surface they are well integrated, but some of
them turn out to have such a radical, anti-Dutch
and anti-western philosophy that they are pre-
pared to take part in violent terrorist activities’
(AIVD, 2002: 39).
Two students from Eindhoven were recruited in
the Netherlands for the Jihad. In January 2003
they were shot dead by Indian border police.
‘Most of [those being recruited] are Moroccan
youths – not kids hanging around on street
corners but well-educated young people of
university or college level struggling with a
serious identity crisis and looking for a way
out through radical politics and martyrdom in
the name of Allah. The established Islamic
bodies such as mosque foundations, schools
and welfare organisations do not play a direct
part in this. They do not engage in recruitment
themselves, but contribute to the creation of the
fertile ground’ (Brouwer, 2002).
Threats outside the premises of the
institution
Sometimes higher education establishments are
sited in places where they run an added social
risk, in particular areas that are unsafe or per-
ceived to be unsafe at night. Students and staff
can be molested, robbed, or confronted with
verbal or physical aggression or even assault.
The University of Professional Education in
The Hague is in such a high-risk area. To reach
the university from Hollands Spoor station it is
necessary to pass through a pedestrian and cycle
subway, ‘and that’s where things go wrong.
Drugtaking and robberies are the order of the
day. The Participatory Council demands action’.
The university itself has no direct responsibility
for the situation outside the walls of the institu-
tion, but it still takes the situation seriously.
‘Naturally we also have a duty as far as possible
to guarantee the safety and security of students,
staff and other employees. For some time now
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the the University has been concerned by the
decline of the area round the station, where in the
evenings the streets are full of drug dealers and
addicts’ (De Posthoorn 2001). According to the
police, the worst problem is the sense of inse-
curity, since in statistical terms there is no reason
to suppose the situation has become any more
unsafe. Even so, 80 per cent of the university’s
students think the station is ‘creepy’, according to
the student paper Atrium (Haagse Courant,
2002). With the growing feeling of unease, con-
sultations took place between the police and the
university, after which the police adjusted their
levels of surveillance to tie in with the lecture
timetable. At the same time extra CCTV cameras
are to be installed.
5. Higher education as an organisation
Introduction
This section is concerned with the organisational
safety and security risks facing higher education.
These are broadly the same risks that face other
similarly sized organisations outside the higher
education and research sector.
An important part of all these risks is main-
taining physical integrity in the face of threats to
buildings, land and movable property belonging
to the institution. Fire and burglary are examples
of such risks, but this chapter also covers risks of
quite a different character such as fraud, the
ordinary risks of any working environment,
threats to the internal working environment etc.
In this chapter we shall consider risks under
two main headings: risks with a primarily internal
cause and risks with a primarily external cause.
Using the methodology of the safety and
security chain we look first at the options open
to educational establishments for managing risks
and incidents in the area of organisational safety
and security. The experience of higher education
institutions will also be presented.
First of all, however, here are some general
conclusions from the questionnaire and interviews.
General
Many institutions report that there has been
growing interest in the theme of organisational
safety and security in their organisations. Safety
and security are increasingly finding their way
onto the agendas of governing boards and many
boards already have designated members with
responsibility for safety and security.
There is general agreement that the level of
awareness of risks amongst staff and students is
comparatively low. At the same time, institutions
believe that technical solutions could be more
widely employed than they are at present.
Sprinkler installations, automatic alarm systems
and burglary prevention systems can contribute
to the security of the organisation.
Risk perception and current developments
Institutions tend to see burglary and fire as the
principal risks to the safety and security of the
organisation. Most institutions still barely recog-
nize other sorts of incident as a realistic threat.
Since the fireworks disaster in Enschede and
the cafe´ fire in Volendam, institutions report that
they perceive higher levels of enforcement of
statutory and other regulations in the area of
physical threats to safety. At the same time,
insurers are imposing ever more stringent re-
quirements on institutions. One unexpected con-
sequence of this is that where budgets remain
unchanged, the investment in safety and security
that is required means reduced investment in
the institution’s primary process, i.e. teaching or
research.
Reporting and recording of incidents
Almost all the institutions surveyed record and
analyse incidents affecting the safety and security
of the organisation. However, the extent to which
they have a systematic way of doing so varies
from institution to institution. Some higher edu-
cation institutions have also started keeping ac-
curate records of near accidents, and in some
cases annual programmes of risk inventories and
evaluations are operated. In such cases the learn-
ing points are taken forward into the planning
and refining of the in-house emergency services.
Risk survey
The survey revealed that about a two-thirds of all
institutions carry out a regular risk inventory and
evaluation, in many cases using advice from
external consultants. By and large these studies
are of a fairly standard health and safety nature.
One or two institutions say they have incorpo-
rated the principle of the learning organisation
into their own organisation. Safety and security
staff at the various faculties maintain each other’s
alertness. From time to time building managers
go through each other’s buildings to pick up hints
and help eliminate mistakes. At another institu-
tion an unannounced inspection is carried out
roughly once a quarter by the facilities manager
and a member of the governing board. This in-
cludes a random sample of basic elements such
as the state of power points, step-ladders etc.
Collaboration with internal and external players
Preventive policy in the area of organisation
safety and security is almost nowhere arrived at
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in consultation with staff and students. However,
this is an area in which there has always been a
high level of involvement on the part of both staff
and students in the preparation and response
phases as regards physical risks: the staff con-
tribute the members of the in-house emergency
response team, while both staff and students take
part in fire drills and evacuation exercises.
Most institutions employ specialist outside
consultants when it comes to designing and
implementing the organisation’s safety and se-
curity policy. One result of this is that many
institutions appear not to have a clear overall
picture of this area. Many institutions, for exam-
ple, consult closely with the local fire services on
matters of fire safety. This clearly has benefits, but
it means that there is a risk that the institution
will lose sight of the fact that looking after the
continuity of its operations is different from the
fire service’s primary responsibility for the perso-
nal safety of individuals.
Organisational safety and security risks
with a primary internal cause
Fire
Fire is one of the most obvious risks to any
organisation. In preparing their in-house emer-
gency response teams and disaster plans, institu-
tions will naturally pay attention to the various
fire prevention systems installed in their build-
ings. Most institutions also regularly hold fire
drills and evacuation exercises which are in-
tended partly as a means of raising awareness
amongst students and staff.
However, the effects of the major fire at the
University of Technology in Enschede were an
eye-opener for both institutions and insurers. The
result has been the imposition of increasingly
stringent requirements by insurers, since on
closer inspection fire turned out to be a much
more serious doom scenario for many institutions
than had been supposed. For example, only a
few higher education establishments were found
to have backups and alternative computing
facilities outside their own complexes. Many
institutions are housed in old buildings – many
of which, of course, are of historical importance –
with concomitant limited fire safety. And many
institutions hold collections, often completely
irreplaceable, which are in danger of being lost
to fire.
Arson
Arson deserves a separate mention as a risk
because fire prevention systems are by and large
not designed to cope with the rapid spread of fire
that is often a result of deliberate fire-raising. The
fire on the complex of the University of Twente in
Enschede, referred to above, is a case in point.
It is not easy to prevent arson. The experience
of insurance companies shows that the symp-
toms often fail to be picked up as the early
warning indicators of more serious incidents to
follow. For example, a burning waste-paper bas-
ket is often overlooked as a failed attempt at
arson, being merely interpreted as an act of
vandalism aimed at the waste-paper basket con-
cerned.
One important motive for arson may be re-
venge by employees, former employees, action
groups and students who have ‘come off the
rails’. Action groups will usually target labora-
tories known or suspected to be carrying out tests
on animals or other socially sensitive experi-
ments. Locations depend on motives, and in
such cases are usually chosen with considerable
care. Attempts at arson inside buildings need to
be prevented by effective surveillance. To sum up,
important factors in combating arson are a)
raising awareness among students and staff and
b) implementing or improving early warning
systems.
Safety and security at work in general
As employers, higher education institutions have
a responsibility for the health and safety of both
their staff and their students. Some courses will
naturally be more prone to physical accidents
than others: the risk of injury is greater for a
student of physical education than for a trainee
accountant. In other words, the risks attendant
on every kind of course need to be assessed
individually. Work in workshops and laboratories
call for extra safety measures.
To varying degrees, institutions are banking on
increasing staff and student awareness of the
risks they run. Some institutions said that
risk awareness was low, particularly among stu-
dents. Some have developed policy in this area,
partly because of fear of litigation in the event of
an accident. One best practice we came across
was to give laboratory staff safety training and
then have them sign for receipt of a safety
manual.
A survey carried out at the University of
Utrecht showed that 40% of the students com-
plained of symptoms of RSI. The university’s
governing board says it plans to take steps to
improve the ergonomics of computer rooms,
but at the same time expresses the view that
RSI is the responsibility of the individual stu-
dent. ‘Students must accordingly take their own
limits into account when it comes to RSI pre-
vention using programs such as Workpace.’
(Willemars, 2002)
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Safety and security at work: the threat to the
interior environment from hazardous substances
(e.g. asbestos)
Several institutions had been faced with the
threat of pollution of the interior environment.
In most cases this followed the discovery of
asbestos, but in some cases it was a matter of
releases of hazardous materials that were being
used for teaching or research purposes. In one
establishment, for example, a formalin leak led to
the fire brigade being called upon to remove the
leaking storage container (Provinciale Zeeuwse
Courant, 2004). Incidentally renovation work can
release other hazardous materials besides asbes-
tos, including paint dust. Some institutions have
particular concerns about safety and security in
and around laboratories. What is curious here is
that they all appear to believe that the safety and
security situation in their own laboratories is well
regulated: it is at the laboratories of other institu-
tions that they foresee more serious safety and
security risks. One risk commonly mentioned in
the surveys is burglary, and in particular the
danger that vandalism or inexpert handling may
cause hazardous materials to be released. One of
these institutions has implemented steps to limit
this risk: not equipping computers on the ground
floor with flat screens and not making laptops
available to members of staff has led to a reduc-
tion in the security risk for the whole building.
A number of institutions covered by the survey
work with microbiological pathogens.2 Safety
and security measures for laboratories working
with such materials are classified in four levels
which apply all over the world: the biosafety level
(BSL) scale. Those with operational responsibil-
ities who were interviewed for the study have
concerns about the safety and security of such
laboratories, largely as a result of budgetary
tensions between safety and security measures
on the one hand and the primary process of
research on the other.
Fraud
Fraud is a multifaceted problem, even in higher
education establishments. As in any organisa-
tion, the first step to take is to try to ensure that
the institution’s own staff are not exposed to
temptation.
A recent example of widespread fraud by
students is the cash card fraud at the Fontys
colleges. Early in 2003 the college administrators
became aware that students had been illegally
loading their chip and PIN cards on a large scale.
The board thinks the loss may be around 50,000
euros, but it may be even higher. Using a device
on sale from mail order firms, it proved quite easy
to load cards without handing over any money.
This kind of trick had previously been observed
on a small scale, but when the practice became
widespread the board decided it was time to
intervene. The college sent all students a letter
informing them of an amnesty for those who
came forward voluntarily, unless they had en-
riched themselves by trading in the loading of
cards (Fontys, 2003). By the time the amnesty ran
out 120 students had gone to the security depart-
ment to admit the offence. The reporting on this
fraud in the regional media is an illustration of
the crisis trends referred to in section 2: ‘It is a
typical case of centralizing services leading to too
great a distance between the shop floor and
service-providers. The service-providers sit in
their ivory towers and ignore signals that things
are going wrong. And when things do go wrong,
Fontys immediately gets things wrong too. The
result is that once again we can read in the papers
what policy makers have been doing with money
that should have been used for teaching’ (Bra-
bants Dagblad, 2003).
Apart from monetary fraud, educational estab-
lishments are also faced with examination fraud,
mainly in the form of plagiarism. This will be
discussed in more detail in the following chapter
on the security of information.
Incidentally fraud involving student funding is
common. However, it falls beyond the scope of
the present study as the institution is the owner
of neither the problem nor its effects.
Organisational safety and security risks
with a primarily external cause
Burglary
Most institutions see burglary as a major risk, not
just in terms of the risk of losing hardware but
also, just as importantly, the risk of losing valu-
able information. Security outside office hours is
by and large considered adequate, with access
control and ID card systems for each building.
During the day, however, colleges and univer-
sities provide an open environment in which
persons of malicious intent can easily and anony-
mously do their worst. Insurers are urging
institutions to institute special telephone lines
to make it easier for people to report unusual
events or people anonymously.
Extreme weather
Extreme weather conditions are barely seen as a
problem. Despite this, they can lead to consider-
able damage and inconvenience. In 2002 two
cloudbursts at the University of Twente caused
substantial flooding and the fire service had to be
called to pump basements dry. It is advisable in
advance to identify which rooms within the
institution are below ground level and the extent
to which problems may arise in the event of
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cloudbursts or extremely heavy or enduring rain
or snow. Particular attention should also be paid
to vulnerable buildings which may be liable to
collapse in severe storm conditions.
The University Library in Maastricht has devel-
oped a disaster plan to bring whole collections of
books to safety in the event of fire and/or water
damage. The plan is based on the disaster manual
published by Overleg Kunst(historische) Bib-
liotheken Nederland n Art Libraries Society /
The Netherlands (OKBN n ARLIS/NL), which
gives instructions for avoiding and limiting da-
mage as a result of fire, flooding and mildew. The
book also provides instructions for packaging
and recording material to be evacuated and the
requirements with which drying rooms must
comply.
There is one weather phenomenon that is
expressly excluded from many insurance policies
and is nevertheless not perceived by most insti-
tutions as being a problem: lightning strike
causing induction currents in electronic equip-
ment. In this way lightning can seriously damage
or even completely destroy computers, television
sets and sensitive measuring equipment even at a
considerable distance from the strike. In modern
educational environments it is impossible to
switch all hardware off when the weather turns
bad: servers generally run day and night, as do
faxes, telephone switchboards, alarm systems
and so on. Without the necessary protection,
not only the equipment but also the knowledge
held within it can literally disappear in a flash.
Infectious diseases
Infectious disease can strike anywhere, and that
includes institutions of higher education. Stu-
dents in higher education, unlike pupils in pri-
mary schools and at some boarding schools, do
not constitute a special risk group. Even so, it is
still possible for a student to contract an infec-
tious disease such as TB or hepatitis A and infect
fellow students.
One special case here is legionnaires’ disease,
caused by the bacterium Legionella pneumophila.
The buildings of any institution can harbour the
disease in their water systems or, more particu-
larly, in other damp locations such as cooling and
air conditioning systems. When water evapo-
rates, aerosols are created: tiny droplets which
can cause infection when they enter the lungs. In
1999 the Netherlands experienced a major out-
break in which some 300 people were infected, of
whom thirty died. The source was found to be a
bubbling pool that was part of the decor for a
flower show. Stricter regulations were subse-
quently introduced.
The SARS epidemic has shown how easily an
infectious disease can spread in hospitals. Many
infections are nosocomial infections: that is, in-
fections that arise in hospitals. Hospitals accord-
ingly have policies and plans to cater for this
eventuality.
With 250 or so Chinese students, the Hoge-
school Zeeland in Vlissingen (Flushing) was
quick to see the potential danger of the SARS
outbreak. The university took a number of mea-
sures including approaching these students by
email recommending that they did not travel
home for the time being. Risk areas were closely
monitored so that if a student should display
relevant symptoms a doctor could be promptly
alerted. Six students returning from a visit to
Shanghai were placed in voluntary quarantine
(De Telegraaf, 2003).
Terrorist threats
Many institutions’ emergency plans cater for the
eventuality of a bomb threat. It is left to the police
to decide how seriously any given threat should
be taken, though in the case of a terrorist threat
involving nuclear, chemical or biological materi-
als the fire service is brought in too. In either case,
evacuation procedures are followed.
Following the anthrax letter bomb attacks in
the United States in 2001, numerous hoax letters
containing powder were sent in the Netherlands.
Obviously a letter of this kind can cause just as
much unrest, anxiety and uncertainty as a bomb
threat.
Institutions at which experiments are carried
out with animals are exposed to a constant threat.
Up to the time of writing a number of incidents
have taken place involving opponents of animal
experiments. These have included three occupa-
tions and a number of bomb threats, demonstra-
tions and arson attacks as well as destruction of
property. Institutions involved in experimenta-
tion with genetically manipulated organisms are
also under constant threat. The institutions con-
cerned do their best to promote a better under-
standing of their work, but this has predictably
little effect on the more radical elements who are
responsible for the more serious campaigns.
One research establishment said that attempts
had been made to infiltrate the institution by
animal rights activists. One of the perceived
risks of such an infiltration is the possibility
that certain acts or situations could be staged in
the laboratory and then photographed, after
which the photographs would be used as the
basis of propaganda against the institution.
6. Higher education as a custodian of
knowledge
The core task of higher education and research is
to gather, develop and disseminate knowledge.
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To achieve this goal, the institutions of higher
education and research must have a range of
facilities available for the use of students and
teaching staff. Knowledge is gathered, analysed
and applied through access to an intranet and to
the Internet, in computer rooms and libraries,
and through lectures, seminars and tutorials.
Most educational establishments try to be as
flexible as possible in their provision of access to
information for students and teachers. At the
same time, however, they run the risk that the
facilities they offer will be abused. This chapter
looks more closely at the risks that institutions
run in their function as custodians of knowledge.
The target of policy in respect of the security of
knowledge consists of two main elements: a)
abuse of the systems in which knowledge is
developed, stored and processed, e.g. computer
networks, and b) abuse of knowledge as a ‘pro-
duct’ with which the educational sector works.
It will be readily apparent that the balance
between the unfettered transfer of knowledge,
on the one hand, and security, on the other, is a
precarious one. Too great an emphasis on secur-
ity will compromise the core task of higher
education and research. For example, it would
today be inconceivable to make it impossible for
students to access the Internet, since this would
clearly have a major impact on the dissemination
and collecting of knowledge. Conversely, how-
ever, unconditional access to facilities is attended
by major security risks. Making the Internet
accessible without some kind of security system
also means easy access for viruses, worms and
other forms of digital unpleasantness, in addition
to offering unauthorized persons an opportunity
to abuse the facilities made available.
In this section we shall further break down the
risks into those with a primarily internal cause
and those with a primarily external cause.
First of all, however, here are some general
conclusions from the questionnaire and inter-
views.
General
Without exception, the institutions taking part in
the survey report that in recent years they have
been taking a growing interest in the security of
ICT systems. Many governing boards now have
an ICT portfolio holder tasked with overseeing
matters of computer and network security. On
the other hand, those who are responsible for the
actual operation of these systems observe that
although more attention is being paid to these
problems, the problems themselves appear to be
growing at an even faster rate. Whereas pre-
viously ICT incidents were relatively rare, now
they are the order of the day. The extent to which
systems are secure varies from institution to
institution. Many institutions have, or are work-
ing on, a policy for ICT security.
Risk perception and developments
ICT is penetrating ever further into the education
system. Electronic learning environments are
gaining in popularity and, if possible, have to be
accessible worldwide. With this growing pene-
tration of ICT systems, however, the vulnerability
of institutions is also growing. This in turn makes
increasing demands on security requirements for
authorization, authentication and protection, in-
cluding encryption. Institutions acknowledge this
growing risk to varying degrees, but in every case
the security of information is swallowing up an
ever larger part of the ICT budget. Yet the users
and financial administrators of ICT systems see
no measurable result of these rising costs. The
fact that a system has not been hacked is not,
after all, a measurable entity. The absence of
incidents then leads to renewed pressure on the
available budget.
Reporting and recording of incidents
The recording and analysis of ICT incidents is
something that most institutions now take ser-
iously, but there are still clear differences in the
professionalism of their approaches. Those at the
forefront in this field have their own central
computer emergency response teams (CERTs)
which have the skills and hardware to tackle,
record and analyse incidents.
Risk surveys
A minority of institutions engage in the systema-
tic analysis of information security risks (includ-
ing ICT risks). A third of the institutions taking
part in the survey confirm they have just started
or are just about to start such a scheme.
Collaboration with internal and external partners
When it comes to the security of knowledge,
collaborating with external players does not ap-
pear to be part of most institutions’ thinking. Nor
do they have any knowledge of any obvious
organisation to which they might report incidents
in this area, or to which they could turn for advice.
Students and teaching staff are engaged in the
security of knowledge mainly by promoting
awareness, and in particular by having their
attention drawn to the use of access codes and
codes of conduct. Some institutions actively raise
awareness levels through advertising campaigns
warning of the dangers of the Internet and
stressing the need to use security software,
make regular backups of data files and treat
passwords with appropriate caution.
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Knowledge security risks with a
primarily external cause
Types of threat to the ICT infrastructure: digital
activism and hacktivism
The various forms of threat to the ICT infrastruc-
ture of higher education establishments can be
broken down into digital activism and hacking:
 Digital activism: Digital activism is the use of
the Internet or an intranet in the service of a
particular cause.
 Hacking: Hacking is the process of gaining
or attempting to gain access to (supposedly)
secure parts of the ICT infrastructure or other
computers. Thus hacking does not by defini-
tion cause damage, but it can do so if the
hacker makes changes to files or routines in
the target ICT system.
In recent years there have been some spectacular
and successful attempts by activist and hackers to
disrupt vulnerable national and international
communication networks (Denning, 2001: 241).
Knowledge gathering for illicit purposes
Almost all educational establishments operate an
open door policy, which means that anyone
wanting to accumulate knowledge is welcome
to take part in the learning process. The criteria
on which students are selected are previous
education and adequate financial resources.
Screening on aspects relating to security is un-
heard of. The same applies, in general, to teach-
ing staff and researchers. In the case of many
courses there is no need for this to be any
different, given that what is being taught is not
in any way confidential. But there are exceptions.
Establishments and departments engaged in
teaching and research in the fields of physics,
chemistry and medicine can be of interest to
countries, groups or companies wishing to steal
or misapply knowledge.
At TNO, the Netherlands’ principal defence
contract research organisation, a constant watch
is kept against the leaking away of knowledge
that might be abused for commercial purposes
or for the fabrication of weapons of mass
destruction. Given the organisation’s history
as a supplier to the defence industry, this is
hardly surprising. TNO has its own safety and
security managers to carry out monitoring and
training, but at university research establish-
ments this awareness of security issues is still far
less well developed.
At the present time neither the Netherlands
nor the European Union has legislation govern-
ing the way citizens are supposed to handle
sensitive information and knowledge. In the
US, by contrast, such legislation does exist in
respect of e.g. biological agents such as anthrax.
‘Over the past few years in a number of
countries Chinese students and scientists study-
ing or working in the West have been discovered
to be involved in intelligence activities. Most of
them were in the West under one or other of the
Chinese government’s official programmes for
boosting knowledge in that country. These are
public programmes the purpose of which is to
enable China’s knowledge economy to catch up
with the West. Taking part in such programmes is
sometimes clearly no more than a cover, how-
ever. Some years ago two Chinese students in the
US managed to gather information that was
useful for the production of a chemical substance
used in sensors and weapons. They succeeded in
passing this information on to China before their
activities were discovered.’ (AIVD, 2004: 10).
Possibly the best-known example of such an
abuse of hospitality in the Netherlands is that of
Dr Abdul Khan, known in his own country as the
father of Pakistan’s atom bomb. Much of his
expertise was gained when he was working on
a sponsored project in the Netherlands during
the 70s. He concluded his placement with the
theft from his employers and hosts of the design
of a sophisticated device used for uranium en-
richment (AIVD, 2003: 19).
Knowledge security risks with a
primarily internal cause
Misuse of ICT facilities
In the perception of most higher education in-
stitutions the most serious risk for ICT systems is
their misuse by students and staff. Misuse in this
context is taken to be use in any way other than
that envisaged by the institution. This can include
the dissemination of seditious messages or porno-
graphic images, but it also covers the deliberate
deletion or corruption of files, the disabling of
systems and the unauthorized use of access codes.
The extent of possible misuse is closely linked to
the degree of security applied to the system.
Those with operational responsibility for the
security of ICT systems in institutions warn of
limited security awareness among end users: in
short, user-friendliness comes before security.
Although most ICT departments provide infor-
mation about security as part of their general
conditions of use etc., users tend to see this more
as an unnecessary imposition than as helpful
information.
The University of Twente in Enschede has one
of the fastest computer networks in Europe and is
thus a particular favourite for computer enthu-
siasts. Not all of them are entirely innocent,
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however, as the above incident shows. At the end
of 2001 the university found itself in the spotlight
when it became apparent that its computer net-
work was at the centre of the European trade in
illicit software. Several persons were arrested
during raids on the campus and their computers
confiscated. They are suspected of being part of
an organized crime syndicate.
Accidental loss of knowledge
The consequences of fire in any building or
complex of buildings depend largely on how
much attention has been paid to the physical
aspect of the security of the organisation. Being
prepared for fire is a prerequisite for being able to
tackle a fire effectively. Fire extinguishers, smoke
alarms and fire retardant materials are all extre-
mely important. For the security of knowledge,
fire – or any risk that can lead to physical damage
– is a major threat. The destruction of computers,
databases and/or libraries can mean an irrepar-
able loss if the knowledge stored in them is lost.
The November 2003 fire in the computing
centre of the University of Twente, referred to
earlier, led to estimated tangible losses of h40–50
million. The intangible losses, however, were felt
far more painfully: from one moment to the next
staff lost unique research material from their own
rooms, doctoral students lost research results,
and project reports and written examination
papers were burnt.
One very important link in the chain of the
teaching and research that go on at universities
and colleges is of course the people who develop
and convey all the knowledge concerned: the
teaching staff, from professors down to the hum-
blest junior lecturer. If any one of them is lost to
the institution due to illness or death this can
mean the loss, too, of knowledge that cannot, or
cannot quickly, be replaced. Clearly, this can lead
in turn to problems of continuity in both research
and teaching.
Intellectual fraud
Intellectual fraud, whether by staff or students,
is a threat to the reputation of the institution
concerned.
Over the past few years the Netherlands has
seen a number of cases of possible plagiarism by
teaching or research staff. In 1996 the case of
clinical psychologist Rene´ Diekstra caused a great
deal of commotion. In the end it became clear
that Diekstra was innocent – but not before he
had been forced to resign and his reputation
and that of the university concerned had been
damaged. The affair led to debate about the
necessity of paying attention to this risk. ‘Whis-
tle-blowing is useful and not something that
should be censured, it seems to me. If you want
to avoid misconduct, you must get everyone to be
on the lookout for transgressions and transgres-
sions must be made a possible subject of discus-
sion’ (Zandbergen, 1996).
Of course, staff members are not the only
people who may be guilty of plagiarism. An
American study revealed that 122 out of 1500
student papers examined contained instances of
plagiarism. This was established by using a sim-
ple computer program to compare phrases in
different papers (Fokkinga, 10 May 2001).
Following a study carried out by his inspecto-
rate, in 2002 the Netherlands’ chief inspector of
higher education called for more attention to be
paid to the scale on which intellectual fraud of
this kind was being committed, and warned
universities and colleges that they were insuffi-
ciently alert to fraud in academic papers and
theses (NRC Handelsblad, 2002). Institutions
immediately endorsed the importance of having
and implementing hard-hitting sanctions to
counter this form of intellectual fraud because
‘this kind of behaviour . . . damages the very
essence of science and scholarship’ (Rector of
the University of Tilburg, 2002). Since then, many
institutions have taken steps to detect fraud in
academic papers and theses. But fraud control
stands or falls by the number of available files
with which papers can be compared, so colla-
boration with other faculties is essential (Uni-
versiteit var Tilburg, 2002) – yet collaboration
between universities and colleges to combat
fraud has yet to materialize. Nor is there any
uniform policy on sanctions, though individual
institutions have announced severe punishments
including dismissal and even seeking criminal
prosecution. Some institutions have developed
codes of conduct for dealing with plagiarism.
7. Conclusions
This study shows that higher education institu-
tions still do not routinely have an integrated
policy on safety, security and crisis management.
Within individual institutions, there is little com-
munication between the three domains (social
safety and security, organisational security and
the security of knowledge). Institutions, staff and
students have limited awareness of the range of
risks to which they and their environment are
exposed. At the same time, establishments tend
not to share their experiences in this field with
others. Even within individual institutions, there
is often little involvement of staff and students in
safety and security policy and its implementation.
In the area of social safety and security, estab-
lishments are seen to be mainly focused on what
can now be regarded as the ‘conventional’ risks
such as theft, sexual harassment or the problems
of individual students for which provisions have
in many cases already been made in the form of
confidential counsellors, complaints procedures
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and sanctions policies. Establishments still seem
to be relatively unaware of the risks that parti-
cular developments in society bring with them.
They are also less well prepared to deal with
incidents occurring outside the establishment but
in which students or staff are involved.
In the area of organisational safety and security,
establishments are found to make preparations
only for the familiar risks in that area, e.g. fire and
burglary. Less common events such as fraud, the
release of hazardous materials or organisms from
laboratories, or the threat of terrorist attack, are
still given low priority. It is precisely within this
area that establishments are currently experien-
cing increasing pressure from external parties such
as licensing authorities, inspectorates and insurers.
In the domain of security of information and
knowledge, establishments currently focus most of
their attention on the risks associated with the
use of information technology. Efforts to control
other risks in this domain, such as intellectual
fraud and the risk that sensitive information will
pass into the hands of undesirable individuals or
organisations, are generally at a much more
rudimentary stage.
Notes
1. Risk management is here defined as all activ-
ities aimed at managing risks, i.e. preventing
them from materializing as incidents. Crisis
management is combating the consequences
of an incident once it has taken place.
2. This category of materials is here taken to inc-
lude viruses, bacteria, prions, fungi and parasites.
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